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FIXING ESG:  
ARE MANDATORY ESG DISCLOSURES THE 
SOLUTION TO MISLEADING ESG RATINGS? 
Javier El-Hage* 
ABSTRACT 
This Note provides an overview of the debate around the current 
state of ESG disclosure practices, and the perceived need for the 
SEC to establish a system of mandatory ESG disclosures. Part I 
explores the inherent difficulty of defining ESG, the problematic 
nature of quantifying and measuring ESG factors, and the tools 
currently being used by market-leading ratings firms and investment 
vehicles. In particular, this part addresses the inconsistencies of ESG 
self-reporting, the influence of this practice on the ensuing ratings, 
and the potential for investors to be misled as a result. 
Part II of the Note explores the possible consequences of a system of 
mandatory ESG disclosure, weighing the main arguments in favor 
and against the establishment of a regulation that mandates ESG 
disclosures. Drawing from a 2018 SEC submission by the law 
professors Cynthia A. Williams and Jill E. Fisch, Part II explores the 
arguments around general market efficiency, U.S. capital markets 
competitiveness, and the ultimate goal of giving investors access to 
better, more consistent, and fairly comparable information, while 
keeping the costs of increased reporting outweighed by the benefits 
of it. 
Part III closes by describing current proposals in favor mandating 
ESG disclosures. In particular, the Note presents the proposal by 
 
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2021; LL.M., Columbia University School 
of Law, 2009; LL.B., Universidad Privada de Santa Cruz, 2007. An early draft of this 
paper was written for Professor William P. Jannace’s seminar on Global Capital 
Markets and Corporate Governance at Fordham Law School. I would like to thank him 
dearly for introducing me to this topic. I would also like to thank Professor Jill E. Fisch 
of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for reviewing an early version of this 
Note and providing guidance on this subject, in which she is a leading scholar. Finally, 
I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate  
& Financial Law for their invaluable help editing this Note. 
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Professor Fisch, under which the SEC may mandate a discussion on 
ESG, while allowing companies the flexibility to decide what factors 
to address and how to address them in view of materiality 
considerations for their specific industries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing economic crisis are bringing 
increased attention to the already hot topic of Environmental, Social, 
and Governance (“ESG”) investing.1 As ESG disclosure initiatives and 
metrics have gained popularity in the functioning of capital markets 
worldwide, the United States faces a regulatory dilemma.2 Should the 
U.S. Congress or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
make broad ESG disclosures mandatory, or will specific climate change-
related disclosure guidelines under Regulation S-K continue to be the 
norm?3 The argument for mandating some form of broad ESG 
disclosure is manifold, but centers chiefly on the increasingly pervasive 
reality of ESG-influenced capital markets, as well as the need to 
promote accuracy and market-efficient standardization as an alternative 
 
 1. See, e.g., Laurence Fink, Larry Fink’s Chairman’s Letter to Shareholders, 
BLACKROCK (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/larry-fink-chairmans-letter [https://perma.cc/5NTG-5NGZ] (“[T]he pandemic 
we’re experiencing now highlights the fragility of the globalized world and the value of 
sustainable portfolios. We’ve seen sustainable portfolios deliver stronger performance 
than traditional portfolios during this period.”); Kristin Broughton & Maitane Sardon, 
Coronavirus Pandemic Could Elevate ESG Factors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/coronavirus-pandemic-could-elevate-esg-factors-
11585167518 [https://perma.cc/N4EJ-EKL5]; see also Coronavirus Pandemic Will 
Drive Responsible (ESG) Investing “Skywards,” MONDOVISIONE (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/coronavirus-pandemic-will-drive-
responsible-esg-investing-skywards-nigel-gr [https://perma.cc/AC8X-TCQF] 
[hereinafter Driving ESG Skywards]; Nick Marsh, The $30 Trillion Trend That’s Bigger 
Than the Entire U.S. Stock Market, OILPRICE (May 05, 2020), https://oilprice.com/ 
Energy/Energy-General/The-30-Trillion-Trend-Thats-Bigger-Than-The-Entire-US-
Stock-Market.html [https://perma.cc/M72B-23M8] (“While COVID-19 is trouncing 
traditional investment themes, sustainable investing—already a $30-trillion mega 
trend—is calling all the shots.”). 
 2. See CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS & JILL E. FISCH, REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) DISCLOSURE 1, 8 (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW4J-
YFEG]. 
 3. See Apostolos Gkoutzinis et al., The SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize 
and Enhance MD&A and Other Financial Disclosures, MILBANK 3 (Nov. 30, 2020), 
https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/4/v4/144237/SEC-Adopts-Amendments-
to-Modernize-and-Enhance-MDA.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CL5-7TCM] (“[T]he SEC 
stated that it has declined to add any requirements relating to [ESG] and sustainability 
matters, citing its principles-based approach to the MD&A . . . in line with the SEC’s 
past guidance set forth in the Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to 
Climate Change.”). 
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to the currently costly and unreliable market-driven self-regulated ESG 
ratings system.4 
Those against mandatory disclosure indicate skepticism that it will 
be able to fix the underlying difficulties that, for example, make current 
ESG ratings unreliable and inefficient. Instead, they assert that 
mandatory disclosure would have the unintended effect of increasing 
costs of doing business across the board, and even of devaluing the 
significance of any material industry-specific and company-specific 
required disclosures.5 They further assert that mandatory disclosure will 
further increase the prospect of costly plaintiff-driven securities fraud 
litigation. 
This paper provides an overview of this debate. Part I of the paper 
describes the problematic nature of ESG tools currently being used by 
the market-dominant investment vehicles. Part II weighs the main 
arguments in favor and against mandatory disclosure regulation as a way 
to fix these problems. And Part III describes current proposals in favor 
of an incremental mandatory disclosure system.6 
 
 4. For recent explanations of the policy dilemma, see Peter Rasmussen, Analysis: 
Will Investors Get the ESG Data They Want in 2021?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 16, 
2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-will-investors-
get-the-esg-data-they-want-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/WYF7-S9CZ] (“A January SEC 
interpretive release, addressing the disclosure of key performance indicators and 
metrics in MD&A, stated in a footnote that the climate change guidance does apply to 
ESG metrics such as the employee turnover rate, workforce factors, total energy 
consumed, and data security measures.”). See also Stacey H. Mitchell et al., Biden’s 
“Money Cop” to Shine a Light on ESG Disclosure as SEC Requirements—and a 
Potential Universal Reporting Framework—Appear Imminent, AKIN GUMP (Feb. 1, 
2021), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/sPBE72pXuuZC6oQirkB3iA/2kqc2e/bidens-
money-cop-to-shine-a-light-on-esg-disclosure-as-sec-requirements.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/65TH-H4JX] (“With respect to the E category, such requirements 
would not require legislation and could take the form of an expansion to the 
Commission’s 2010 [Guidance] or, more likely, a new rulemaking (e.g., another 
‘modernization’ of Regulation S-K or an entirely new rule altogether).”). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 
GEO. L.J. 923 (2019). 
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT VOLUNTARY ESG DISCLOSURES 
AND MARKET-DRIVEN RATINGS 
There are several problems with the current approach to making 
ESG disclosures. This section lays out the inherent problems in defining 
ESG; how inconsistently defined ESG factors lead to problematic ESG 
ratings; and the problems caused by the current framework of voluntary 
disclosures and inconsistent methodologies. 
A. DEFINING ESG 
The first difficulty presented by the current role of ESG factors in 
capital markets and corporate governance is defining which ones they 
are and what exactly they are attempting to indicate or measure.7 
Broadly speaking, in addition to corporate governance (which stands for 
the “G” in ESG), ESG factors typically include a wide range of issues 
that are not part of traditional financial analysis, but may still have 
investment relevance or materiality.8 These factors may cover discrete 
aspects such as “how corporations respond to climate change,” how well 
they manage their water use, whether their supply chains fall short of 
international human rights standards, how they treat their labor force, 
and whether they have a corporate culture that fosters innovation.9 
Very importantly, most information that is currently factored into 
ESG analysis largely comes from companies’ voluntary disclosures or 
survey responses to rating firms’ questionnaires.10 The market for ESG 
definitions and standards is heavily influenced by four market-leading 
rating companies that compete among themselves to provide ESG 
metrics: MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, RepRisk, and ISS.11 Together, these 
 
 7. See generally TIMOTHY M. DOYLE, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAP. FORMATION, 
RATINGS THAT DON’T RATE: THE SUBJECTIVE WORLD OF ESG RATINGS AGENCIES 1 
(2018). 
 8. See Georg Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg 
[https://perma.cc/J7DW-ARPX]. 
 9. Id. (“The term ESG was first coined in 2005 in a landmark study entitled ‘Who 
Cares Wins.’ Today, ESG investing is estimated at over $20 trillion in AUM or around 
a quarter of all professionally managed assets around the world.”). 
 10. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 13. 
 11. See id. at 7; see also Billy Nauman, Credit Rating Agencies Join Battle for ESG 
Supremacy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/59f60306-d671-
11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 [https://perma.cc/42FU-X8JZ] (“Now Moody’s and S&P 
Global, two of the big three credit rating agencies, are elbowing their way in, offering 
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companies rate over 100,000 companies across dozens of industries and 
sectors and also rate more than 400,000 equity and fixed-income 
securities.12 They are said to heavily influence the market for ESG 
ratings because they are consistently chosen by the world’s leading 
investment vehicles, namely BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors, 
and others.13 
Not only the methodology, but also the quantity and quality of data 
factors that each of these four firms employ, are disparate. As analyzed 
by Timothy M. Doyle from the American Council for Capital Formation 
(ACCF) in a groundbreaking 2018 report: 
[E]ach rating agency has a customized scoring method which 
evaluates different non-financial metrics and frequently disagree 
about the components of ESG . . . . Core ESG metrics vary from as 
few as 12 performance indicators to as many as 1,000 for other 
agencies.14 
MSCI, for example, “evaluates 37 key ESG issues divided into 
three pillars (environmental, social, and governance) and ten themes 
(climate change, natural resources, pollution & waste, environmental 
opportunities, human capital, product liability, stakeholder opposition, 
social opportunities, corporate governance, and corporate behavior).”15 
Alternatively, Sustainalytics examines a minimum of 70 ESG indicators 
in each industry, and breaks them down into “three distinct dimensions: 
preparedness, disclosure, and performance.”16 
RepRisk, on the other hand, intertwines ESG issues—including 
environment, community relations, employee relations, and corporate 
governance—with the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact.17 
RepRisk also measures ESG risk exposure using twenty-eight ESG 
 
separate ESG scores on companies in addition to their traditional assessments of 
creditworthiness.”). 
 12. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 13. Id. at 7. 
 14. Id. at 8; see also Timothy Doyle, The Big Problem With “Environmental, 
Social and Governance” Investment Ratings? They’re Subjective, INVS. BUS. DAILY 
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/the-big-problem-with-
environmental-social-and-governance-investment-ratings-theyre-subjective 
[https://perma.cc/NT4R-24JN]. 
 15. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 8. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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issues and forty-five “hot topics.”18 Finally, the ISS E&S Quality Score 
evaluates more than 380 factors, with “at least 240 for each industry 
group, divided into environmental and social factors . . . includ[ing] 
management of environmental risks and opportunities, human rights, 
waste and toxicity, and product safety, quality, and brand.”19 These 
distinctive approaches may still provide useful broad signals to the 
market, but they lead to significant differences in results, and this, as 
discussed below, undermines the quality of information the market is 
relying on when making sustainable investment decisions.20 
Compounding the problem, ESG rating agencies do not fully 
disclose their methodologies or the material impact of selected 
indicators, likely as a result of overprotectiveness of their proprietary 
methodologies.21 This, in turn, leads to an overall lack of transparency 
over ratings and the inexistence of rating firm-prompted agreements on 
best practices.22 
B. CURRENT USE OF INCONSISTENTLY DEFINED ESG FACTORS 
ESG factors are used primarily in three ways: traditional investing, 
sustainable investing, and investment stewardship.23 ESG integration in 
traditional investing consists of the introduction of ESG factors into 
traditional financial analysis to account for risks that may diminish a 
company’s long-term valuation; for instance, regulatory action due to 
environmental violations.24 
Sustainable investing is the “explicit incorporation of ESG 
objectives into investment products and strategies,” including 
maximizing exposure to companies with high ESG ratings to increase a 
fund’s average ESG score.25 More narrowly, it can mean focusing on 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See infra Section I.C. 
 21. See DOYLE, supra note 7, at 8 (quoting Michael Sadowski et al., Rate the 
Raters Phase Three Uncovering Best Practices, SustainAbility (Feb. 2011)). 
 22. Sakis Kotsantonis & George Serafeim, Four Things No One Will Tell You 
About ESG Data, 31 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 50, 58 (2019). 
 23. Barbara Novick et al., Exploring ESG: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 
BLACKROCK 1, 2 (2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/ 
viewpoint-exploring-esg-a-practitioners-perspective-june-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/592G-8T4S]. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. 
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companies with low carbon emissions, or screening out companies with 
significant labor violations.26 
Finally, investment stewardship is a synonym for corporate 
governance.27 It typically involves the leading proxy advisory firms 
engaging with companies as shareholders in an attempt to enhance the 
value of investments, or, increasingly, promote what they consider to be 
the right public policy.28 This takes place through dialogue with officers 
and proxy voting “to build a mutual understanding of the material risks 
facing companies and the expectations of management to mitigate these 
risks . . . and to encourag[e] sustainable financial performance over the 
long-term.”29 
Considering that asset management leaders like BlackRock,30 
Vanguard Asset Management,31 Charles Schwab,32 State Street Global 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. In practice, this means that shareholder proxy leading firms, such as 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co. “will make voting 
recommendations based on ESG positions taken by a company.” Dennis T. Whalen, It’s 
Time to Reassess ESG and Sustainability Reporting, NACD BOARDTALK (Oct. 28, 
2019), https://blog.nacdonline.org/posts/reassess-sustainability-reporting [https:// 
perma.cc/6FMS-QLEW]. But cf. Neil Whoriskey, The New Civil Code: ISS and Glass 
Lewis as Lawmakers, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 28, 2020), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/07/28/cleary-gottlieb-discusses-the-new-
civil-code-of-iss-and-glass-lewis [https://perma.cc/J66W-N384] (“ISS and Glass Lewis 
have arrogated to themselves the power to make law, promulgating a civil code of 
astounding breadth and detail . . . and, increasingly, ESG policies ranging from animal 
welfare to climate change, diversity, data security and political activities.”). 
 29. Novick et al., supra note 23. For examples of investments of the second and 
third type, see Amin Rajan, Enlightened ESG Investors Engage, But Retain Right to 
Divest, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3b10c36c-eb80-4971-
aa74-10a8079fc3e7 [https://perma.cc/PU9V-QUP7]. See also Michelle Scrimgeour, 
Index Investors Should Not Be Passive Owners When It Comes To ESG, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2019), https://amp-ft-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.ft.com/content/ 
210a6c79-2be4-47f0-a99c-aa4b821d0330 [https://perma.cc/E97Z-JCJK]. 
 30. Novick et al., supra note 23. 
 31. See generally ESG investing: Discover funds that reflect what matters most to 
you, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/esg/ [https://perma.cc/8C6C-
4XFG] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021). 
 32. Socially Responsible ETFs, CHARLES SCHWAB, https://www.schwab.com/etfs/ 
types/socially-responsible-etfs [https://perma.cc/V8NP-SLB4] (last visited Aug. 20, 
2021). 
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Advisors,33 Fidelity Investments,34 and BNY Mellon Investment 
Management35 each pursue a combination of these three forms of ESG 
investing and corporate governance advocacy, their actions or failures to 
act may significantly shape the functioning of both capital markets and 
corporate boardrooms.36 
Over the last 25 years, in addition to the market-dominating rating 
firms, over 100 ESG standard-setting initiatives have emerged, causing 
“option overload” for companies.37 These include the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Climate Disclosure 
Standards Board (CDSB), which have jointly created the influential38 
Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD), as well as 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP), among others.39 These initiatives, while well-intentioned, 
contribute to poor market-wide communication and lack of 
transparency.40 
Despite efforts at streamlining disclosures,41 the overcrowding of 
initiatives continues to make the market for suggested methods and 
 
 33. Our ESG Solutions, STATE STREET, http://www.statestreet.com/solutions/by-
capability/esg.html [https://perma.cc/24DD-B6DK] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021). 
 34. Fidelity U.S. Sustainable Index Fund, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch. 
fidelity.com/mutual-funds/summary/31635V398 [https://perma.cc/W4V9-85GM] (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2021). 
 35. ESG Analytics, BNY MELLON, https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/what-we-
do/investment-services/asset-servicing/esg-analytics.jsp [https://perma.cc/8XFF-BAPX] 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2021). 
 36. Edward Helmore, Wall Street Investment Giants Voting Against Key Climate 
Resolutions, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2019/sep/17/wall-street-asset-management-climate-change-blackrock-vanguard 
[https://perma.cc/N9BA-YE63]. 
 37. Whalen, supra note 28; see WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 9 (“Over the 
last twenty-five years, voluntary disclosure of ESG information, and voluntary 
frameworks for that disclosure, have proliferated to meet the demands for information 
from investors, consumers, and civil society.”). 
 38. Id. at 12–14. 
 39. Whalen, supra note 28. 
 40. WORLD ECON. F., SEEKING RETURN ON ESG: ADVANCING THE REPORTING 
ECOSYSTEM TO UNLOCK IMPACT FOR BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 1, 18 (2019), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ESG_Report_digital_pages.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9VG4-5D42]. 
 41. NASDAQ, ESG REPORTING GUIDE 2.0: A SUPPORT RESOURCE FOR COMPANIES 1, 
13 (2019) (“Divergent metrics have been streamlined, as have divergent ESG reporting 
frameworks . . . Nasdaq even narrowed the list of 33 ESG metrics in the previous 
368 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
purposes for ESG disclosures confusing for investors.42 This 
inconsistency, combined with the powerful moral rhetoric behind ESG 
advocacy, has led SEC commissioner Hester M. Peirce to liken ESG 
ratings to “scarlet letter[s] . . . we see labeling based on incomplete 
information, public shaming, and shunning wrapped in moral rhetoric 
preached with cold-hearted, self-righteous oblivion to the consequences, 
which ultimately fall on real people.”43 
C. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES AND 
INCONSISTENT METHODOLOGIES 
The fact that ESG ratings are driven largely by inconsistent data 
providers—typically rating firms—creates practical problems for the 
operation of market actors, including investors and issuers, all of which 
affect the integrity and efficiency of global capital markets. 
1. Inconsistent Methodology Leads to Different Data Being Sought 
From the Same Company Leading to Different Results 
The lack of standardization among ratings firms—or market data 
providers—can be confusing for companies and misleading for capital 
market actors as company ESG scores frequently vary across rating 
firms.44 
Research conducted by Florian Berg of the MIT Sloan School of 
Management, shows ESG ratings from different sources are aligned in 
only about 6 out of 10 cases, compared to creditworthiness ratings, 
which match 99% of the time.45 Similarly, Doyle’s research for the 
 
version to just 30 in this one . . . to focus more effort on . . . the most . . . achievable 
ones.”). 
 42. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 9–10 (“By 2017, 83% of the top 100 
companies in the Americas published a corporate responsibility report, as do 77% of 
top 100 companies in Europe and 78% in Asia. Of the largest 250 companies globally, 
reporting rates are 93%.”). 
 43. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r., SEC, Scarlet Letters: Remarks Before the 
American Enterprise Institute (June 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speech-peirce-061819 [https://perma.cc/W76C-BKTQ]. 
 44. See Kotsantonis & Serafeim, supra note 22, at 57 (“In discussing the methods 
they use to assess a company’s performance, data providers should include not only a 
list of material issues and a description of their scoring methodology, but more detail on 
the peer groups used, and clearly distinguishing between real and imputed data.”). 
 45. Nauman, supra note 11. 
2021] FIXING ESG DISCLOSURE 369 
ACCF, citing CSRHub, shows that ESG rating agencies frequently 
disagree even when evaluating the same company.46 “When comparing 
MSCI’s and Sustainalytics’ ratings for companies in the S&P Global 
1200 index, CSRHub found a weak correlation (0.32) between the two 
firms’ ratings.”47 
As Doyle has pointed out, “[r]ating agencies in other capital 
markets are much more closely aligned.”48 For example, “Moody’s and 
S&P’s credit ratings have a very strong positive correlation (0.90).”49 
The main difference between credit ratings and ESG ratings is attributed 
to the fact that credit ratings use consistent information, in the form of 
standardized financial disclosures, while ESG ratings do not.50 
2. Whether Self-Serving or Not, Current Disclosures Can Mislead the 
Market 
Most ESG data ultimately used by rating firms and other ESG 
factor integrating institutions is voluntarily reported by the companies 
being rated. The reporting occurs through the publication of annual 
sustainability reports or through informal responses to voluntary surveys 
driven largely by rating firms.51 This way, voluntary reporting allows for 
near complete customization of style, format and content of 
disclosures,52 and “provides ample room for companies to manipulate 
the disclosure process.”53 Unlike financial statements used for 
investment analysis, these ESG disclosures are unaudited, which creates 
further incentives for companies to try to adjust favorably to rating 
methodologies and to consequently always put the company in a good 
light.54 
 
 46. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 13. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. SOL KWON, INV. RESP. RSCH. CTR. INST., STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND 
INTEGRATED REPORTING 2018 5 (Heidi Welsh et al. eds., 2018), 
https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018-SP-500-
Integrated-Reporting-FINAL-November-2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ7J-JSM9]. 
 53. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 9 (“According to the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board, roughly 75% of the information reported in sustainability reports is 
already addressed by issuers in their SEC filings. However, 90% of known negative 
events are not disclosed in either the SEC filings or sustainability reports.”). 
 54. See id. 
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The Doyle report provides an example of the limitations of 
voluntary disclosure with the case of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company.55 Sustainalytics gave the tire company a higher score than 
industry standard, presumably on account of the comprehensiveness of 
the information they disclosed, despite being a company “fraught with 
ESG issues and exposure, such as asbestos-related claims, various 
OSHA fines, and litigation settlements.”56 
The ACCF report also highlights inconsistent ratings by RepRisk 
and Sustainalytics over Bank of America (“BofA”), which has high 
exposure to ESG-related risks involving business ethics, including 
exposure to litigation, suspicion over mortgage-backed securities 
scandals, and a political loan scandal involving Countrywide Financial.57 
While both rating firms factored in the same issues, they produced 
“dramatically different [scores] due to inconsistencies in how the ratings 
providers interpreted these issues.”58 
Whether voluntary disclosures are self-serving or merely 
idiosyncratic, the data processing and ultimately the scores produced by 
the different rating agencies show a similar degree of inconsistency that 
can mislead investors and materially affect investment decisions.59 
Moreover, companies lack consistent benchmarks necessary to properly 
measure “peer groups” for meaningful comparison, and to encourage 
measurable improvement.60 
3. Ratings Biases 
Beyond the lack of consistency resulting from both the 
methodology used by rating firms and the quality of information being 
reported by companies, the ACCF report has identified and carefully 
documented three kinds of biases across ratings methodologies. 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 13–14. 
 58. Id. at 14. 
 59. See id. at 14 (“In addition to inconsistencies in how various issues are 
interpreted by ratings agencies, differing methodologies only compound the lack of 
clarity for investors. Without standardized grading methodologies, these scores may 
lead investors in different directions and certainly cause confusion if compared.”). 
 60. Kotsantonis & Serafeim, supra note 22, at 53–54. 
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a. Size Bias 
Regarding size bias, ESG ratings by Sustainalytics show that larger 
companies tend to obtain better ESG ratings.61 The ACCF report used a 
sample size of over 4,000 companies, and the result suggested that the 
larger companies’ ability to devote more resources to preparing non-
financial disclosures is the key factor leading to higher ratings.62 MSCI 
addressed a similar “imbalance indicating that ‘[c]ompanies with higher 
valuations might be in better financial shape and therefore able to invest 
more in measures that improve their ESG profile; such investments 
might lead to higher ESG scores.’”63 As a result, according to the ACCF 
report, small and mid-sized companies would seem to be “at a 
competitive disadvantage” in ESG ratings, even when these companies 
may “create the most jobs and tend to be the most innovative.”64 
For example, as cited by the ACCF report, the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (“BMS”) pharmaceutical company has an $83 billion market 
capitalization and a Sustainalytics ratings score of 73, which is 20 points 
better than the healthcare industry average and 25 points above the 
overall Sustainalytics average.65 The company has been involved in 
high-profile controversies including “questionable experimental testing 
methods and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations,” but as a high 
market cap company, it “implements GRI Sustainability Reporting 
Standards and has established high-profile ESG goals,”66 which account 
for its high ESG ratings. 
The ACCF report then compared BMS with the performance of 
Phibro Animal Health, a smaller pharmaceutical company operating “as 
a diversified animal health and mineral nutrition” organization.67 
Despite its comparatively small $1.7 billion market capitalization, 
“Phibro employs over 1,400 professionals and ‘has a responsibility to 
deliver safe, effective, sustainable products and to provide expert 
 
 61. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. at 9 (quoting Guido Giese et al., Foundations of ESG Investing: How ESG 
Affects Equity Valuation, Risk, and Performance, 45 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 1, 2 (2017), 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/03d6faef-2394-44e9-a119-4ca130909226 
[https://perma.cc/5C4B-FZQ2]). 
 64. Id. at 10. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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guidance about their use.’”68 Phibro also “runs the educational website 
animalantibiotics.org [that] engage[s] stakeholders about animal health 
issues, including responsible antibiotic use and resistance.”69 Despite its 
mission statement-based track record and operational alignment with 
ESG concerns, Phibro has a Sustainalytics score of only 46, “which is 3 
points worse than the healthcare industry average and 8 points below the 
overall Sustainalytics average.”70 “Instead of providing transparency, 
[size] bias shows how such ratings systems are not only subjective, but 
can also leave investors in the dark about the actual strength of a 
company’s ESG practices.”71 
MSCI, one of the rating firms, has responded to this alleged size 
bias—namely, that “small-cap stocks have low ESG ratings”—calling it 
a “myth [that] stems from the early years of ESG research when larger 
companies were better able to disclose ESG-related data compared to 
smaller ones.”72 According to the company, their research now shows 
that this “reporting bias was mitigated due to more disclosures by mid-
cap companies, as well as enhancements made to the MSCI ESG 
Ratings model.”73 
b. Geography Bias 
Comparing ESG ratings across geographies in a global market is 
difficult for several reasons. The ACCF report, however, has identified a 
bias in favor of European companies vis-à-vis North American ones, 
which may be based on persuasive reporting and investor sentiment 
towards the materiality of ESG reporting, rather than on actual ESG 
practices: 
A telling example of geographic bias is evident when comparing the 
BMW Group and Tesla. BMW has a high rating (93rd percentile) 
despite a slew of controversies, including anti-competitive practices, 
illegal marketing practices, business ethics violations relating to 
 
 68. Id. (quoting Responsibility, PHIBRO ANIMAL HEALTH CORP., 
https://www.pahc.com/responsibility [https://perma.cc/26SU-6M36]). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Guillermo Cano, Factors and ESG: The Truth Behind Three Myths, MSCI 
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/factors-and-esg-the-truth/ 
01291000034 [https://perma.cc/8EQA-CMA3]. 
 73. Id. 
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intellectual property, employee and human rights violations along 
their supply chain, and even animal rights violations. The company 
is facing accusations of collusion with Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche, 
and Daimler on various technological issues and systems to evade 
environmental and safety regulations. 
In contrast, Tesla (38th percentile) is below every single European 
auto manufacturer, including the companies named in the collusion 
accusations above. Most notably, Tesla’s score even lags 
Volkswagen, which . . . has been implicated in a major 
environmental violation. Meanwhile, Tesla is the world leader in 
technology to reduce carbon emissions from automobiles.74 
According to the ACCF report, if we consider the conspicuous 
environmental and ethical violations committed by BMW and other 
European automakers,75 their comparison in ratings performance with 
Tesla strongly suggests that their “score is more a reflection of the 
amount of information disclosed—a requirement in Europe—than a 
company’s adherence to ESG practices.”76 
c. Industry Sector Bias 
Also following the ACCF report, ratings agencies seem to assign E, 
S, and G weights to companies without correctly factoring in company-
specific risks, despite their stated objective to “normalize” ratings by 
industry.77 While it is important to establish industry benchmarks in an 
attempt to standardize disclosures and metrics within an industry, 
industry-weighting standardization may also bias ratings and be 
misleading to investors: 
One example of unbalanced industry exposure is iShares MSCI KLD 
400 Social ETF, the largest ESG focused ETF fund. Currently the 
fund invests heavily in information technology companies. In fact, 
information technology investments account for 31% of the $1 
 
 74. See DOYLE, supra note 7, at 10–11 (“In Europe, the EU requires companies 
with 500 employees or more to publish a ‘non-financial statement’ as well as additional 
disclosures around diversity policy. North America has no such requirement for 
disclosure, which is one source for the positive bias toward European companies.”). 
 75. See Alex Gibney, Dirty Money: Hard NOX, NETFLIX (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.netflix.com/watch. 
 76. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 11. 
 77. Id. 
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trillion in assets under management, with the top three investments 
being Microsoft, Facebook, and Google.78  
The ACCF report suggests that, while common for ESG ratings, 
categorizing all companies similarly within each industry, underlines the 
“need for a more tailored approach to the ratings process.”79 For 
example: 
In its own evaluation of ESG investing, MSCI acknowledges that 
company-specific risks are not a focus and the systematic issues that 
face a given industry play a more important role: ‘In essence, the 
MSCI ESG Rating is a reflection of companies’ residual risk 
exposure to their industry’s most significant key issues after taking 
into account companies’ risk-mitigation techniques.’80 
4. Failure to Identify Risk 
The methodological inconsistencies and biases identified above in 
the ACCF report are magnified when scandals representing the 
materialization of risks resulting from poor corporate governance or 
intentional damage to the environment fail to substantially affect a 
company’s high ratings. In September 2015, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) found that Volkswagen was guilty of 
intentionally using a “defeat device” to circumvent official emissions-
testing software, effectively causing 11 million vehicles worldwide 
produced from 2009 to 2015 to pollute at a much higher rate than 
advertised.81 The company was sanctioned with more than $25 billion in 
fines and penalties to account for one of the worst violations of the 
Clean Air Act by a corporation ever.82 
Despite this, Volkswagen continued to have an “ESG rating higher 
than its peer average. The ratings dropped from well above average at 
 
 78. Id. at 11–12. 
 79. Id. at 12. 
 80. Id. (quoting Giese et al., supra note 63). 
 81. See id. at 11–12; see also GIBNEY, supra note 75; Jack Ewing, Volkswagen 
Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in Diesel Deception, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/international/volkswagen-
diesel-car-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/H6N8-TLG5]. 
 82. See Roger Parloff, How VW Paid $25 Billion for “Dieselgate”—and Got Off 
Easy, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-vw-paid-25-
billion-for-dieselgate-and-got-off-easy [https://perma.cc/ZW8M-ZBXP]. 
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77 to still 6 points above average at 66 following the scandal becoming 
public.”83 According to the ACCF report, “[t]his example is concerning 
because it shows a complete failure by the ratings agencies to accurately 
capture ESG risk, even after a blatant attempt at bypassing 
environmental regulations.”84 The report continues to state that while 
this arguably constituted clear environmental and corporate governance 
failures, “the subjectivity and biases inherent to ESG ratings ensure[d] 
that ratings agencies [were] either unable or unwilling to both identify 
risk and properly protect investors from mismanagement.”85 
5. Overall Insufficiency 
Given this myriad of problems with the quality of voluntary ESG 
disclosures and ratings, large asset managers like Blackrock and 
important industry players like Bloomberg have publicly expressed their 
discontent. Blackrock has asserted that current reporting practices are 
insufficient for the kinds of in-depth investment analysis that it seeks 
with its ESG integration, making it “difficult to identify investment 
decision-useful data.”86 
Similarly, in 2016, Bloomberg, a company that sells capital markets 
data, reached conclusions similar to those of BlackRock about the 
quality of ESG data. Even though Bloomberg has incorporated ESG 
factors into the data that it sells to dealers, brokers, and investors around 
the world, its CEO Michael Bloomberg said that “[f]or the most part, the 
sustainability information that is disclosed by corporations today is not 
useful for investors or other decision-makers . . . .”87 
The current situation of voluntary ESG disclosures and market-
driven ratings is full of problems, throwing its usefulness into question. 
Part II below lays out the arguments in favor of and against making 
disclosures mandatory, potentially resolving these issues. 
 
 83. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 16. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Novick et al., supra note 23, at 4. 
In our experience, current corporate sustainability reporting often includes 
disclosure about factors that, while honorable, are less relevant to investment 
decision making (e.g., corporate philanthropy). As a result, current reporting 
practices may make it difficult to identify investment decision-useful data (e.g., 
water usage and risks in the aforementioned beverage company example). Id. 
 87. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting BLOOMBERG, IMPACT REPORT 
UPDATE 2015 2 (2015), http://www.bbhub.io/sustainability/sites/6/2016/04/ 
16_0404_Impact_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/84MJ-6BZ5]). 
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II. WEIGHING ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MAKING ESG 
DISCLOSURES MANDATORY 
ESG-factor integration and general use in global capital markets is 
growing, and this includes the United States. U.S.-domiciled assets 
using sustainable, responsible, and impact investing (“SRI”) strategies 
grew from $8.72 trillion in 2016 to $12.0 trillion at the start of 2018.88 
This was a 38% increase, and the amount went from representing 21% 
to 26% of the total assets under professional management in the U.S.89 
As Williams and Fisch have noted, “[t]hese latter data starkly 
contrast with the facts when the SEC last considered the issue of 
expanded social and environmental disclosure in comprehensive 
fashion, between 1971 and 1975.”90 At the time, “there were two active 
‘ethical funds’ in the United States, which by 1975 collectively held 
only $18.6 million assets under management, or 0.0005% of mutual 
fund assets.”91 
The growing importance of ESG factors, in addition to the myriad 
of problems with the current system as highlighted in Part I, have led 
many market players, including the largest asset managers and rating 
firms, as well as some capital markets academics, to call for the SEC to 
issue a regulation making at least some form of ESG disclosure 
mandatory. “The economically advanced nations of the world are 
transitioning toward mandatory broad ESG disclosures, and this is a 
transition the United States, however reluctantly, is likely to make in 
time.”92 
In 2018, the corporate law professors Cynthia A. Williams and Jill 
E. Fisch submitted a petition to the SEC advocating in favor of SEC 
 
 88. Compare WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 8–9 (providing figures as of 
2016), with U.S. SIF FOUND., REPORT ON U.S. SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT 
INVESTING TRENDS (2018), https://www.ussif.org/files/2018%20_Trends_OnePager_ 
Overview(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/ATX7-774M] (providing updated numbers as of late 
2018). 
 89. Id. 
 90. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 8. 
 91. Id. (quoting Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission 
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1267 (1999)). 
 92. Leonard W. Wang, Insight: ESG Disclosures—Prospects for the Future, 
BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 30, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-
accounting/insight-esg-disclosures-prospects-for-the-future [https://perma.cc/RMG9-
68M3]. 
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regulations to mandate ESG disclosure.93 The petition further 
acknowledged and incorporated the requests by important market 
players.94 Below are the main arguments in favor of this ESG disclosure 
regulation, as well as the potential drawbacks and arguments against 
them. 
A. MARKET EFFICIENCY: INVESTORS WILL HAVE BETTER, MORE 
CONSISTENT, COMPARABLE INFORMATION 
The efficient capital markets hypothesis includes two different 
types of efficiency: first, “informational efficiency,” meaning the 
existence of “market mechanisms able to process new information 
quickly and with broad distribution,” and, second, “allocative 
efficiency,” or the ability to “distribut[e] capital resources to their 
highest value use at the lowest cost and risk.”95 According to Williams 
and Fisch, capital markets are constrained in promoting allocational 
efficiency when they do not have “consistent, comparable, reliable, and 
complete information.”96 
To achieve the second type of efficiency it is key that the 
information being quickly transmitted under the first type is in fact 
providing reliable signals so that market participants can choose to 
allocate capital efficiently.97 As seen in Part I, however, the current ESG 
ratings system hardly allows participants to make even reasonably 
informed decisions in allocating capital in an ESG-conscious way. For 
example, despite the fact that climate change poses both risks and 
opportunities to companies in most industries, it is proving very difficult 
under the current system for companies to achieve efficiency as they 
attempt to “manage the transition to a low-carbon future by supporting 
the allocation of capital to its risk-adjusted highest-value use in that 
transition.”98 
As we have seen above, under the current system of market-driven, 
self-regulated, voluntary disclosure, the information produced by 
companies and ratings firms is often incomplete, inconsistent, and not 
comparable between companies or industries.99 Citing a 2015 paper on 
 
 93. See WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. at 10. 
378 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
market reactions to mandatory nonfinancial disclosure, Williams and 
Fisch suggest that “when ESG disclosure becomes mandatory, standards 
become clearer and reporting becomes more consistent and 
comparable.”100 
B. COMPETITIVENESS FOR CAPITAL FORMATION VIS-À-VIS OTHER 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
Proponents for mandatory ESG disclosure argue that, by 
implementing this regulation, the SEC would be, among other things, 
spurring competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and public 
companies.101 
According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for Responsible 
Investment at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, 
more than 20 countries have passed legislation within the last 15 years 
to require publicly-traded companies to issue reports that include 
environmental and social information.102 Also, seven stock exchanges, 
including the London Stock Exchange, now require social and 
environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements.”103 
To the extent that US companies fail to disclose information which 
global investors are being encouraged, and in some cases required, to 
consider, they will be at a disadvantage in attracting capital from 
some of the world’s largest financial markets. This highlights that 
US corporate reporting standards will soon become outdated if they 
are not revised to incorporate global developments regarding the 
materiality and disclosure of ESG information.104 
Williams and Fisch further assert that mandatory disclosure would 
promote capital formation. By providing more, and better, information 
 
 100. Id. (citing Jody Grewal et al., Market Reaction to Mandatory Nonfinancial 
Disclosure 27 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-025, 2015), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2657712 [https://perma.cc/JHF8-D62K] (arguing that 
“firms having high ESG disclosure and stronger governance performance will be able 
to institute the [EU Directive on non-financial reporting] more efficiently and cost-
effectively” because the reporting is mandatory, thus creating consistency)). 
 101. Grewal et al., supra note 100, at 4. 
 102. Id. at 5. 
 103. Id. (noting that the remaining six are ASX, Brazil’s Bovespa, India’s Securities 
and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malaysia, Oslo’s Børs, and the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange). 
 104. Id. 
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about risks and opportunities to investors, and by “standardizing what is 
currently an uncoordinated and irregular universe of ESG disclosures,” 
the SEC would increase confidence in capital markets, a deciding factor 
in attracting capital:105 
This confidence may well mobilize sources of capital from investors 
who are currently unwilling to invest given knowledge gaps or 
information asymmetries. Particularly retail investors, who are 
important as long-term investors and investors in small and medium 
enterprises, may be emboldened by a clearer sense of the social and 
environmental aspects of companies’ activities as a guide to 
companies’ longer-term risks and opportunities.106 
Alongside the discussion about increasing U.S. regulatory 
competitiveness with respect to other major capital markets, there is the 
potential issue of additional costs for companies to comply with an 
additional set of rules. The positions around this issue are laid out 
below. 
C. BURDEN ON ISSUERS: HIGHER COSTS VS. REDUCED COSTS 
In Hong Kong, proposals to make ESG disclosures mandatory have 
already triggered mixed responses between those who find they will 
unduly and excessively burden companies, and others who are more 
open to what they see as an inevitable prospect.107 Similarly, in the 
United States, voices have been heard from members of Congress 
opposing a bill that would make ESG disclosures mandatory.108 
 
 105. Id. at 5–6. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Patrick Temple-West, Companies Resist Hong Kong ESG Disclosure Proposal, 
FIN. TIMES (Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/026ee8f2-b2de-11e9-8cb2-
799a3a8cf37b [https://perma.cc/S44E-U8MB] (“In May, HKEX proposed forcing listed 
companies to publish statements about ESG-related risks. But the Chamber of Hong 
Kong Listed Companies, whose members include Tencent and China Mobile, said it 
wants the exchange to leave disclosure to the discretion of companies.”). 
 108. See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. 
(2019–2020); see also Patrick Temple-West, U.S. Congress Rejects European-Style 
ESG Reporting Standards, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/0dd92570-a47b-11e9-974c-ad1c6ab5efd1 [https://perma.cc/PTE5-J96R] (“In 
interviews with the Financial Times before the hearing, Republicans said they did not 
want to hit companies with additional disclosure obligations. Corporate rules for 
environmental protection already exist and adding disclosure costs could have a 
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Other critics in the United States like the Manhattan Institute, a 
libertarian think tank, argue that the “most obvious . . . [danger] in using 
government as a tool to enforce [SASB-like ESG] standards” is the cost 
burden of increased reporting.109 From the Institute’s view, reporting and 
compliance costs, which have already increased in recent years, 
ultimately favor larger firms because they already have large legal and 
regulatory compliance staffs.110 Similarly, a point has been raised that 
publicly-traded corporations have already been falling in number and 
that “throwing the government’s weight behind [mandatory ESG 
disclosure] risks driving even more companies from America’s publicly 
traded stock markets, which have fewer corporate listings today than in 
1975.”111 
Alongside these risks, however, we may also weigh possible 
benefits of more robust ESG disclosures. For example, from a securities 
fraud risk perspective, it is in the best interest of all public companies—
large and small—to provide meaningful ESG disclosures, to the extent 
they relate to specific factors material to their businesses and industries. 
But disclosures that are too general and aspirational in an attempt to 
prevent shareholder and SEC lawsuits may end up “frustrating important 
stakeholders instead of impressing them.”112 This uncomfortable middle 
ground could be preparing companies for the transition to some form of 
mandatory disclosure, while allowing them to take the full benefit of 
reduced costs of standardization.113 As a result, companies could “be 
better prepared for compulsory disclosure rules if and when they are 
mandated by the SEC.”114 
The fact is that, as discussed above, industry-led standardization 
has already been underway over the past few years spurred by stock 
 
negative material financial impact on companies, said Republican representative 
Warren Davidson of Ohio.”). 
 109. Howard Husock & James R. Copland, “Sustainability Standards” Open a 
Pandora’s Box of Politically Correct Accounting, INVS. BUS. DAILY (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/sustainability-standards-open-a-
pandoras-box-of-politically-correct-accounting [https://perma.cc/98RU-AYB6]. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Wang, supra note 92. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. 
2021] FIXING ESG DISCLOSURE 381 
exchanges and industry leaders—for example, through the Nasdaq ESG 
initiative, and under influential initiatives like the TCFD.115 
Moreover, as noted by Williams and Fisch, companies today are 
already burdened with meeting investor expectations for sustainability 
information even though they lack clear standards on how to do so. 
“[B]ecause there isn’t clear guidance . . . different companies are using 
different frameworks and multiple mechanisms to disclose sustainability 
information.”116 In other words, companies have already been pushed to 
heavy burdens of voluntary disclosure, and yet “investors are still 
dissatisfied with the comparability of sustainability information, even 
between companies in the same industry.”117 
Taking this into account, mandatory disclosure regulation could, 
instead of increasing it, reduce the cost burden for companies:118 
That ESG disclosure requirements could actually reduce burdens on 
America’s public companies was well-stated in the CFA Institute’s 
Comment Letter to the Concept Release: “Many issuers already 
provide lengthy sustainability or ESG reports to their investors, so 
many issuers will not face a new and burdensome cost by collecting, 
verifying and disclosing ESG information. Costs may be saved if 
instead of producing large sustainability reports that cover a broad 
range of sustainability information, issuers can instead focus on only 
collecting, verifying and disclosing information concerning the 
factors that are material to them and their investors.” 
The arguments regarding costs seem to be strong on both sides of 
the debate. Next, we address the potential for higher litigation risk 
emerging from mandatory disclosure regulation. 
D. HIGHER RISK OF LITIGATION? 
The Manhattan Institute has argued that “[t]he more significant 
costs of mandatory SASB-style disclosures, however, are those flowing 
 
 115. See WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 9–10; see also Blaine Townsend, The 
Case for Standardized, Audited ESG Reporting, ACCT. TODAY (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-case-for-standardized-audited-esg-
reporting [https://perma.cc/2VPN-8MJG]. 
 116. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 12. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. (quoting CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYSIS INSTITUTE, COMMENT LETTER 
TO THE CONCEPT RELEASE: BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BY 
REGULATION S-K 18–19 (Oct. 06, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
16/s70616-375.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU64-82DQ]). 
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from the leverage that such mandated disclosures would necessarily give 
to politicized enforcement agents at the SEC and Department of 
Justice.”119 For this libertarian think tank, mandatory disclosure would 
give excessive power “to politically ambitious state attorneys general, 
and to class-action plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking to pounce on alleged 
misstatements.”120 
This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the fact that, 
currently, companies who choose to make voluntary disclosures are 
already subject to the risk of anti-fraud securities litigation.121 Moreover, 
while companies may still be found liable over misleading climate risk 
disclosures, comparative legal analysis suggests that failing to carry out 
climate-risk disclosures (a traditional ESG factor) is also likely to 
prompt litigation.122 
Finally, climate-change litigation occurring under the current 
system has the potential to pressure the SEC to act and impose at least 
climate-related ESG disclosures.123 
 
 119. Husock & Copland, supra note 109. 
 120. Id. 
To be sure, state AGs and plaintiffs’ lawyers may be able to harass or sue 
companies for voluntary disclosures using old-fashioned tort claims or overly 
broad state statutes like New York’s Martin Act securities law. But with a 
mandatory SEC disclosure rule, the potential for regulation through litigation or 
prosecution outside the normal legislative lawmaking process would be greatly 
multiplied. 
 121. See Jonathan D. Guynn, Insights: Managing Legal Risks for ESG Disclosures 
Under U.S. Law, JONES DAY (July 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/ 
07/managing-legal-risks-for-esg-disclosures-us-law [https://perma.cc/FXX3-L8DK]. 
 122. Robin Hamaker-Taylor et al., Voluntary Climate Disclosures Can Reduce 
Litigation Risk, ACCLIMATISE UK (June 13, 2019), http://www.acclimatise.uk.com/ 
2019/06/13/voluntary-climate-disclosures-can-reduce-litigation-risk [https://perma.cc/ 
9HU9-QBMV]. 
 123. Wang, supra note 92. 
In a landmark 2016 decision captioned Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 
1224 (D. Ore. 2016), the federal district court in Oregon ruled, that there is a 
fundamental right under the Constitution to a climate that would sustain human 
life. The novelty of the decision triggered a frenzy of appellate activity that 
continues to date. 
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E. DESPITE THE RISKS, INVESTORS AND COMPANIES ARE PRO-
REPORTING 
A survey from 2014 showed that practically 80% of investors were 
dissatisfied with the comparability of ESG reporting between companies 
in the same industry.124 In May 2020, an SEC subcommittee 
acknowledged this reality, and further recommended the Commission to 
require issuers to “directly provide material information to the market 
relating to ESG issues used by investors to make investment and voting 
decisions.”125 Leonard W. Wang, a former SEC official, has noted that 
“as ESG disclosures grow in importance . . . [t]he potential for losses 
from inaccurate or fraudulent ESG disclosures will rise.”126 
As Wang put it, “[f]raud and deception gravitate toward unguarded 
venues, [and so] [i]nvestor losses from ESG disclosure failures could 
increase pressure for broad mandatory disclosure requirements.”127 
These future losses, according to Wang, “will increase the already 
significant pressure for mandatory broad disclosures” because 
“[u]ltimately, regulation cannot lag too far behind the market.”128 
Moreover, recent attempts in Europe at increasing mandatory ESG 
disclosures provide, in Wang’s view, an example of the global push in 
that direction.129 
Other industry concerns with the status quo suggest mandatory 
disclosure may also serve to reduce potential ethics controversy or 
litigation risks, especially to the extent that it will level the playing field. 
Blackrock researchers found that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
“ethics controversies are more likely for firms that adopt popular ESG 
policies,” as opposed to those that keep their ESG disclosures to a 
 
 124. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SUSTAINABILITY GOES MAINSTREAM: INSIGHTS 
INTO INVESTOR VIEWS 8 (May 2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-
resource-institute/publications/assets/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-
views.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4FE-QQJ9]. 
 125. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RECOMMENDATION FROM THE INVESTOR-AS-
OWNER SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE RELATING TO 
ESG DISCLOSURE 8 (May 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-
committee-2012/recommendation-of-the-investor-as-owner-subcommittee-on-esg-
disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAK3-UQP4]. 
 126. Wang, supra note 92. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Insights: Investors’ ESG Demands Drive Regulation, KPMG (May 2019), 
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/05/investors-esg-demands-drive-
regulation-fs.html [https://perma.cc/67QT-HKCY]. 
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minimum.130 Along the same lines, important ESG indexes are said to 
“favor companies that disclose more ESG policies and as a consequence 
generally have greater controversy exposure than an ESG-unaware 
benchmark.”131 Despite the obvious risks, the current mix of incentives 
and market practices seems to have made companies generally more 
inclined to robust ESG reporting. 
III. THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTING MANDATED DISCLOSURES 
The sensible implementation of any degree of mandatory ESG 
disclosures is likely to compound the challenges already presented by 
the difficulty of defining ESG and by current market-influenced 
practices in ESG reporting. This section sets out to describe some of 
these additional challenges and lays out what seem to be the more 
sensible proposed solutions. 
A. A TASK FOR THE SEC 
While some standardization has come about by way of industry-led 
initiatives and self-regulation, complete standardization is unlikely short 
of disclosures being made mandatory. Both Congress and the SEC have 
the ability to mandate such ESG disclosures.132 Though the prospect of 
Congressional action was not high under the Trump administration 
judging by the reaction when the idea was floated in early 2019, that 
animus appears to have changed rapidly under the current Biden 
administration.133 In any case, the only legislative initiative currently 
 
 130. Gerald T. Garvey et al., A Pitfall in Ethical Investing: ESG Disclosures Reflect 
Vulnerabilities, not Virtues, 15 J. INV. MGMT. 1, 2 (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2840629 [https://perma.cc/7KAK-
J59F]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Townsend, supra note 115. 
 133. Compare Temple-West, supra note 108, with Kristin Broughton & Mark 
Maurer, Companies Could Face Pressure to Disclose More ESG Data, WALL ST. J. 
(DEC. 6, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-could-face-pressure-to-
disclose-more-esg-data-11607263201 [https://perma.cc/TP8X-SZKD]. See also 
Mitchell et al., supra note 4. 
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being discussed limits itself to mandating the SEC to “define ESG 
metrics.”134 
Of the two policymakers, the SEC is more likely to act, whether it 
is mandated to do so by an act of Congress such as the ESG disclosure 
bill mentioned above, or in implementation of the SEC’s current 
regulatory powers, even at the risk of being challenged in court.135 In 
2014, the SEC already solicited public comments to its “Disclosure 
Effectiveness” initiative, seeking to “evaluate and potentially reform 
corporate disclosure requirements.”136 “As part of that initiative, a 2016 
Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by 
Regulation S-K (“Concept Release”) solicited opinions” from the public 
on ESG disclosures.137 
Williams and Fisch, who led the submission of the most 
authoritative brief advocating for mandatory disclosures, noted that 
“[r]equiring firms to disclose more ESG information is . . . consistent 
with the SEC’s authority to promote market efficiency, and within its 
broad mandate ‘to promulgate rules for registrant disclosure as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.’”138 
While as of late November 2020 the SEC had all but ratified its 
continued approach of taking small interpretive steps in addition to the 
2010 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate 
Change, by February 2021 the drumrolls seemed to be announcing 
imminent approval of a regulation for broad and mandatory ESG 
disclosures.139 
 
 134. See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong., 
§ 2(a) (2019–2020). 
 135. Wang, supra note 92 (“The SEC may have doubts about its legal authority to 
promulgate broad ESG disclosure standards. It may hesitate because of judicial rulings 
against its regulation for conflict minerals disclosure . . . The potential for litigation to 
challenge new broad rules may also discourage the SEC.”). 
 136. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 1. 
 137. Id. 
 138. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting Business and Financial 
Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Securities Act Release No. 33-10064, 2016 
WL 1458170 (Apr. 13, 2016)). 
 139. See Rasmussen, supra note 4; Mitchell et al., supra note 4. 
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B. MATERIALITY OF ESG DISCLOSURES 
The concept of materiality, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., was also emphasized in Williams 
and Fisch’s submission to argue that material disclosures affect the 
market in a way that SEC action is required to reduce likelihood of 
fraud:140 
As the Court said, “[p]ut another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.” Thus, what is material 
depends on reasonable investors’ perceptions of what information is 
already available in the market, and how any new or omitted 
information changes those perceptions of the quality of management, 
when voting or engaging with management, or the value of a 
company or its shares, when investing or selling.141 
The catastrophic economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic, 
and the avalanche of securities fraud litigation that is likely to arise from 
it,142 may provide support to the claim that at least climate-related ESG 
information—to the extent that it may have an effect on results, either 
by adjusting for or by foreseeing a catastrophic risk—is increasingly 
material for investors generally.143 
For one, ESG funds seem to have performed better than non-ESG 
funds, confirming a trend of better performance in recent pre-
coronavirus years.144 Given that oil prices had plummeted just before the 
coronavirus pandemic hit, the relatively better performance of ESG 
 
 140. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting TSC Industries v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Update: Mitigating Securities Litigation Risks Related to the Coronavirus, 
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 143. See Fink, supra note 1; Driving ESG Skywards, supra note 1. 
 144. Id.; see also Sanghamitra Saha, Zacks, ESG ETFs Appear Unscathed by the 
Coronavirus Carnage, YAHOO! FIN. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/ 
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funds might be a result of overall worse performance of funds that have 
more investments in the fossil fuel energy industry.145 
Additionally, the lack of public health preparedness exposed by the 
coronavirus is likely to make the environmental risk of a catastrophic 
rise in sea levels146 posed by climate change more present in the minds 
of investors.147 
In this general vein, the ESG Simplification Disclosure Act broadly 
proposes for ESG factors to be considered “de facto” material:148 
MATERIALITY.— It is the sense of Congress that ESG metrics, as 
such term is defined by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (2), 
are de facto material for the purposes of disclosures under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933.149 
More recently, on November 13, 2020, the U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) adopted amendments to the “investment duties” regulation 
under Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), interpreting that, in order to comply with their fiduciary duties 
under ERISA, pension fund managers should consider only “pecuniary” 
aspects in determining materiality of ESG considerations—at least for 
the purposes of ERISA.150 
 
 145. See Imogen Tew, What the Oil Shock Means for ESG Funds, FT ADVISER 
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C. PROPOSALS FOR DISCRETE AND BROAD INCREMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
REGULATION 
As discussed above, current ESG factors used in voluntary 
disclosures can be wide ranging and cover dozens of different items and 
subcategories, all of which broadly fall under the environmental, social, 
and governance categories.151 Moreover, the material portions of a 
company’s disclosure may correspond to one of these factors or 
subcategories, and so a one size fits all solution may prove to do little in 
the way of better informing investors’ decisions.152 
Furthermore, if all private sector initiatives to date, including those 
by both rating agencies and market-leading wealth management funds, 
have failed to come up with standardized metrics, it may not be realistic 
to expect the SEC to be able to “define ESG factors” effectively because 
of the complexity this task entails.153 
As a result, an incremental approach for mandatory disclosures is 
what may be more advisable at this stage. This type of incremental 
approach towards mandatory disclosure may take two forms. First, it can 
focus on discrete, specific factors. Second, it can focus on all factors 
while not settling on a detailed method of line-item disclosures, and 
allow investors to decide what material factors may be most relevant or 
“material” for investors in their specific industry. 
For an example of the first approach, a 2019 student note proposed 
targeted climate change disclosure aimed at encouraging green-house 
gas reductions.154 Specifically, the note proposed a regulation that would 
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“mandate[] GHG emissions reduction framework and require[] quarterly 
reporting of accurate climate change-related internal data” with an aim 
to tracking—and ultimately penalizing—carbon emissions by large 
corporations that surpass a certain threshold.155 
For an example of the second approach for incremental regulation, 
Fisch proposes for the SEC to adopt an additional Regulation S-K 
requirement for mandating “Sustainability Discussion and Analysis” 
(SD&A), where companies may choose three issues within the wide 
ESG factors for mandatory discussion. Fisch’s proposal is modeled after 
existing Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) regulations. The 
proposal addresses the flexibility that may be required as the SEC enters 
an area where agreement on details has proven difficult:156 
It is too early to determine the extent to which sustainable business 
practices impact economic performance, or the degree to which 
boards that engage with sustainability can exercise better risk 
management and monitoring. SD&A disclosure represents a valuable 
first step that would enable investors and researchers to weigh those 
questions with minimal burden on corporate issuers.157 
In our opinion, Prof. Fisch’s proposal of an incremental approach 
towards mandatory disclosure that allows investors to decide what 
factors to address has the additional benefit of providing the SEC with 
an opportunity to act now, but in a way that doesn’t stifle 
experimentation or the ability to fine-tune the regulation as reporting 
practices on ESG continue to evolve. 
CONCLUSION 
Some form of mandatory ESG disclosure seems to be an impending 
reality. While an ESG mandatory disclosure regulation is likely to raise 
many implementation issues, and even create new problems, it may also 
prove beneficial for a short-term improvement in the efficiency of U.S. 
capital markets and corporate governance institutions. The current 
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situation of self-regulated and voluntary disclosures that turn into ratings 
and metrics which confuse and mislead investors does not seem to be 
sustainable in the long term. 
As described in this Note, the amount, the nature of and market 
demand for ESG information has changed dramatically over the last 25 
years to the point that, today, both academics as well as leading market 
participants are in agreement that it is time for either Congress or the 
SEC to seriously consider making some form of ESG disclosure 
mandatory. On the one hand, mandatory disclosures are likely to 
eventually lead to standardization and cost reduction for companies 
currently making them on a voluntary basis. On the other, they will 
increase the stakes and costs to companies that do not currently factor 
ESG components in their disclosure analysis. Ultimately, however, 
standardization would lead to ESG information becoming more reliable 
and actionable, as other forms of SEC-supervised disclosures. 
While standardization is desirable, the difficulty of arriving to a 
one-size-fits-all rule suggests that the SEC should, at this stage, follow 
an incremental approach to regulation. The SEC should either focus on 
mandating disclosure on one specific factor, when applicable—for 
example, climate change—or allow companies flexibility on deciding 
what factors to address and how to address them. 
